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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
CaseNo.20000044-CA

JOSE MARIO JIMENEZ,
Defendant/Appellant.

Priority No. 2

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §
78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996), whereby the defendant in a district court criminal action may take
an appeal to the Court of Appeals from a final order for anything other than a first degree
or capital felony offense. Appellant Jose Mario Jimenez ("Jimenez") was convicted of
manslaughter with a firearm enhancement, a second degree felony offense in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205 (1995), and two counts of attempted manslaughter with
firearm enhancements, both third degree felony offenses in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§§ 76-5-205 and 76-4-101 (1995). A copy of each judgment is attached hereto as
Addendum A.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
The issues presented for review are as follows:
1. Whether the trial court erred in failing to grant a motion for a mistrial/new trial
in connection with improper statements and suggestions made by the prosecutor during

cross-examination of defense witnesses.
Standard of Review: M[I]f a trial court has applied the correct legal standard, it has
broad discretion in granting or denying a motion for a new trial." State v. Martin, 1999
UT 72, Tf5, 984 P.2d 975. In determining whether a prosecutor's deliberate misconduct
constituted an abuse of discretion and deprived a defendant of a fair trial sufficient to
warrant a new trial, this Court will apply a two-part test:
[The test examines whether] f, [l] [t]he actions or remarks of [the prosecutor] call
to the attention of the jury a matter it would not be justified in considering in
determining its verdict and, [2] if so, under the circumstances of the particular
case, whether the error is substantial and prejudicial such that there is a reasonable
likelihood that, in its absence, there would have been a more favorable result" [for
the defendant].
State v. Basta, 966 P.2d 260, 268 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting State v. Tennev, 913 P.2d
750, 754 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 923 P.2d 693 (Utah 1996)); State v. Trov, 688 P.2d
483, 486 (Utah 1984); see also State v. Kohl, 2000 UT 35, f22, 392 Utah Adv. Rep. 3.
2. Whether the trial court erred in failing to grant a mistrial/new trial in connection
with improper statements made by the prosecutor during closing argument.
Standard of Review: See the standard of review set forth above.
3. Whether the cumulative effect of the errors in the case denied Jimenez a fair
trial.
Standard of Review: Reversal is appropriate if the cumulative effect of the several
errors undermines confidence that a fair trial was had. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,
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1229 (Utah 1993). In assessing cumulative error, this Court considers all the identified
errors as well as errors this Court assumes may have occurred. Id.
PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT
The first issue is preserved in the record on appeal (f,R.M) at 343:369; 344:403,
444, 450-59. The second issue is preserved at R. 345:659, 667, 701. The third issue
concerning cumulative error is reviewed on direct appeal where the record is adequate.
See e.g. Dunn. 850 P.2d at 1229.
RULES, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The following rule will be determinative of the issues on appeal: Utah R. Crim. P.
24 (2000). The text of that provision is attached hereto as Addendum B.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, Disposition in the Court Below.
On July 29, 1998, the state filed an amended Information against Jimenez,
charging him with one count of murder, a first degree felony offense, and two counts of
attempted murder, second degree felony offenses, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 765-203 (Supp. 1996) and 76-4-101 (1995). (R. 4-6.) The charges stemmed from an
incident that occurred on or about October 20, 1996. After the preliminary hearing (see
R. 48), the case was bound over for trial.
On September 13, 1999, a four-day jury trial commenced. (See R. 342-345.) At
the conclusion of trial, the jury found Jimenez guilty of one count of manslaughter and
3

two counts of attempted manslaughter. The jury also found Jimenez guilty of using a
firearm in connection with each count. (R. 282-87.) On November 29, 1999, the judge
sentenced Jimenez to an indeterminate prison term for each offense. (R. 308, 311,314.)
Jimenez filed a timely notice of appeal. (R. 321.)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A. THE STATE'S EVIDENCE.
The state presented evidence at trial as follows:
Police Responded to a Shooting at a 7-11 Convenience Store.
On October 20, 1996, police responded to a shooting at a 7-11 convenience store at
4100 South Redwood Road. (R. 343:201, 216; see also 343:227, 304.) Henry David
Miera ("Miera") had been shot. Two other individuals, Anthony Montoya ("Montoya")
and Manuel Rios ("Rios"), claimed the suspect shooter fired a weapon at them as well. A
convenience store security camera recorded most of the incident on tape and was secured
by police as evidence. (R. 343:310-11.)
The 7-11 Video Was Played at Trial.
The video, played in its entirety at trial (R. 343:231), showed Rios, Miera and
Montoya pulling up to the 7-11 in a white car. Rios got out of the car and entered the
store to use the restroom. (R. 343:232.) A couple minutes later, a male - later identified
as Jimenez - and his wife Monica pulled up in a black car and stepped out of the vehicle.
Jimenez walked up to the white car while Monica went into the store. (R. 343:233-34.)
4

As Rios walked out of the store, he observed Jimenez in a confrontation with
Montoya. (See R. 343:234-35, 275; 344:436.) Montoya was standing outside the white
car, while Miera was sitting in the driver's seat. (R. 343:234-35, 275; 344:434.)
Rios walked up to Jimenez and asked whether he "had a problem." (R. 343:23435.) Jimenez responded with the same question as Montoya walked around the car
toward Jimenez. (R. 343:235.) According to Rios, the expression, "you got a problem,"
means "[do you] want to fight or something." (R. 343:243-44.)
Thereafter, Rios punched Jimenez "[pjretty good[.]" (R. 343:235-36.) According
to Rios, he hit Jimenez because he was "going for something in the front of his pants[.]"
(R. 343:236, 276, 278.) Other evidence presented by the state supported that Jimenez was
not "going for something"; rather, Rios punched Jimenez without justification. (See R.
343:280 (Rios testified in earlier proceedings that the first time he observed the gun was
after he hit Jimenez) 343:197, State's Exhibit 3 (interview with television reporter where
Montoya disclosed that he and Rios contemplated punching Jimenez before they learned
he had a gun); Defendant's Exhibit 3-A (transcript of interview between Montoya and
television reporter).)
Rios testified that he was much bigger than Jimenez, and he was a boxer. (R.
343:245-46.) According to Rios, he was not the kind of person who would "back down"
during a verbal confrontation. (R. 343:246.)
Rios believed the punch was enough to knock Jimenez out. (R. 343:276, 281.)
5

Consequently, he was surprised to see Jimenez get up from the ground. As Jimenez got
to his feet, he pulled a gun from his waistband and began to shoot. (R. 343:236-37.) Rios
and Montoya ran for cover and began throwing beer bottles and bundles of firewood at
Jimenez. (R. 343:238.)
According to the evidence, Jimenez fired approximately seven rounds. (R.
343:308.) Two shots were fired in the direction of Miera sitting in the car. Additional
shots were fired as Montoya and Rios ran across the front of the car and out of the range
of the camera. (R. 343:282.) Jimenez also ran out of the range of the camera, then came
back and left with Monica in the black car.
When Rios and Montoya returned to the white car, they discovered that Miera had
been shot. They pulled him from the car and began to administer mouth-to-mouth
resuscitation. (R. 343:241.)
According to a State Witness, Jimenez Admitted to Shooting a Man at the 7-11.
Amber Fabela testified that Jimenez drove to her home that night after the
shooting. (R. 343:186.) He was hysterical and claimed that he had "just killed
somebody" at a 7-11 convenience store. (R. 343:187-88.) Jimenez denied having made
the statement. (R.344:589.)
Miera Died of Two Gunshot Wounds.
The medical examiner testified that Miera died of two gunshot wounds to the chest
area. (R. 343:293, 298, 301.) Jimenez was apprehended in 1998 and charged with one
6

count of murder and two counts of attempted murder. (R. 12-14.)
B. THE DEFENDANT'S EVIDENCE.
The defense presented evidence in this case to support the determination that
Jimenez fired the gun in self-defense and to protect his wife, Monica.
Jimenez and Monica Were Confronted by 3 Intoxicated Men and Felt in Danger.
Jimenez testified that when he and Monica pulled in front of the 7-11, they were
confronted by three men who were intoxicated and looking for a fight. The men engaged
in a verbal confrontation with Jimenez, then Rios punched Jimenez and knocked him to
the ground. Jimenez felt threatened; he determined to protect himself and Monica from
their attackers. (R. 344:563, 573-74.) Jimenez testified that while he was on the ground,
he observed Miera open the car door and point an object at him that appeared to be a
weapon. (See R. 344:563-65, 438.) Jimenez pulled a weapon out from under his shirt and
began to fire. (R. 344:563.)
Although the Police Did Not Find a Weapon in Miera's Can the Evidence
Supported the Determination that the Police Investigation Was Incomplete.
After the shooting, Jimenez and Monica left the 7-11 store. According to the
video, Rios and Montoya did not return to the white car for some time. They were out of
the range of the video camera (R. 344:536-37), and it is unknown what they were doing.
(R. 344:539.) When Rios and Montoya were back in view of the camera, they returned to
the white car and began removing items from it. (R. 344:537.) One item appeared to be
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cans of beer; another item was unidentified. (R. 344:538.) Rios and Montoya may have
thrown the items into the garbage can. (R. 344:538.)
When officers arrived on the scene, they checked an area near the garbage can for
the cans of beer, which they located immediately. Thereafter, the officers discontinued
their search of the garbage cans. (R. 343:344-45.)
Jimenez maintains that Rios and Montoya hid the object or weapon that Miera
used to threaten Jimenez in the vicinity. Since the officers did not describe their
investigative efforts in their reports and did not appear to search the immediate vicinity or
garbage cans for a possible weapon (see R. 344:524-25), the state was unable to present
compelling evidence to refute the possibility that Rios and Montoya concealed a weapon
in the area. (See R. 344:554 (officers investigating scene did not describe areas searched
or specify that they searched the garbage cans or that they searched for weapons).)
In addition, the defense presented evidence to support that a routine investigation
would have involved a thorough search of the area, including the garbage cans, and a patdown search of victims and witnesses to determine if they were armed. (R. 344:521, 524,
529-30.) According to the evidence, such an investigation did not occur in this case.
(See R. 343:317-342, 344-45; 344:524.)
C. THE JURY ACQUITTED JIMENEZ OF THE CHARGES BROUGHT BY
THE STATE AND CONVICTED HIM OF LESSER OFFENSES.
The jury acquitted Jimenez of murder and attempted murder, and convicted him of
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manslaughter and attempted manslaughter. (R. 282-87.) Additional facts relating to the
issues on appeal are set forth below.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Prior to the trial in this case, the defense moved to have evidence of Jimenez's
alleged, prior bad acts and crimes suppressed. The state stipulated to the motion and the
trial judge granted it. Thereafter, in violation of the court's order and in violation of the
rules of evidence, the prosecutor interjected improper statements and innuendoes at trial.
Specifically, the prosecutor made improper statements and suggestions concerning
Jimenez's character, as follows: (a) The prosecutor suggested to the jury that Jimenez
used numerous aliases, (b) The prosecutor suggested that Jimenez had a violent history,
(c) The prosecutor asserted during Monica's examination that Jimenez's possession of a
gun was a crime "in and of itself," thereby suggesting to the jury that it should consider
matters that were not properly before it, and (d) The prosecutor asked Monica if she
assisted in "concealing" Jimenez from police, again suggesting to the jury that it should
consider matters that were not properly before it.
On appeal, Jimenez maintains that the improper statements called the attention of
the jurors to matters they were not justified in considering. In addition, under the
circumstances of this case, there was a probability that the jurors were influenced by the
prosecutor's remarks, resulting in reversible error.
Also, during closing argument, the prosecutor compared Jimenez's appearance at
9

trial in a suit and tie to the appearance of Rios, a state witness who wore prison clothes
and shackles to the trial. The prosecutor argued that the jury could trust Rios because
they could trust his appearance; however, they should not trust Jimenez because they
could not trust the way he was "packaged." The prosecutor's comments were unfair; he
sought to discredit Jimenez because he had exercised his right to attend trial dressed "in
the 'garb of innocence.'" State v. Mitchell 824 P.2d 469, 473 (Utah App. 1991)
(recognizing that defendant is entitled to be tried in a suit since that comports with the
presumption of innocence). The improper comparison called the attention of jurors to
matters they were not justified in considering. In addition, the comments were
prejudicial, thereby requiring reversal of this matter on appeal.
Finally, the errors individually and collectively prejudiced Jimenez. He
respectfully requests that this Court reverse the conviction in this case and remand the
matter for further proceedings.
ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE PROSECUTOR ENGAGED IN MISCONDUCT DURING
HIS EXAMINATION OF DEFENSE WITNESSES. JIMENEZ WAS
ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL AS A RESULT OF THE MISCONDUCT.
The prosecutor in this case committed deliberate misconduct. He circumvented
evidentiary rules and defied a pretrial order on four separate occasions in order to get
information in front of the jury that it was not allowed to consider. As a result of the
misconduct, Jimenez requested a new trial pursuant to Rule 24, Utah R. Crim P.
10

Rule 24 provides that a defendant may be entitled to a new trial "if there is any
error or impropriety which had a substantial adverse effect upon the rights of a party."
Utah R. Crim. P. 24(a) (2000). A trial court has discretion under Rule 24 to grant a new
trial, and an appellate court will not disturb the trial court's ruling unless it appears the
trial court has abused its discretion to the prejudice of the defendant. See State v. Smith.
776 P.2d 929, 931 (Utah App. 1989); see also State v. Harmon. 956 P.2d 262, 276 (Utah
1998) (quoting State v. Hav. 859 P.2d 1, 6 (Utah 1993)) (other cites omitted).
Prosecutorial misconduct may be grounds for a new trial. See State v. Owens. 753
P.2d 976 (Utah App. 1988). In determining whether prosecutorial misconduct has
deprived defendant of a fair trial, Utah appellate courts have applied a two-part test:
[This test examines whether] "[1] [t]he actions or remarks of [the prosecutor] call
to the attention of the jury a matter it would not be justified in considering in
determining its verdict and, [2] if so, under the circumstances of the particular
case, whether the error is substantial and prejudicial such that there is a reasonable
likelihood that, in its absence, there would have been a more favorable result."
State v. Basta. 966 P.2d 260, 268 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting State v. Tennev. 913 P.2d
750, 754 (Utah App.), cert denied. 923 P.2d 693 (Utah 1996)); State v. Trov. 688 P.2d
483, 486 (Utah 1984).
The first step is "clearly met" when the prosecutor has violated a pretrial order or
evidentiary rules. See State v. Span. 819 P.2d 329. 335 (Utah 1991V The second part of
the test is "more difficult." IcL It refers to the prejudice analysis. "If the prejudice is
such that there is a reasonable likelihood the jury would have reached a more favorable
11

result absent the comments, we will reverse." State v. Pearson, 943 P.2d 1347, 1352
(Utah 1997). As set forth herein, Jimenez has met both parts of the test.
A. DURING WITNESS EXAMINATIONS, THE PROSECUTOR
INTERJECTED IMPROPER INNUENDOES.
1. The Prosecutor's Statements and Suggestions.
Applying the first part of the test, the prosecutor in this case, Howard Lemcke,
called the attention of jurors to matters they were not justified in considering.
Specifically, on four separate occasions during trial, the prosecutor made improper
statements and suggestions concerning Jimenez's character, as fallows: (a) the prosecutor
suggested to the jury that Jimenez used numerous aliases, (b) the prosecutor suggested
that Jimenez had a violent history, (c) the prosecutor asserted during Monica's examination that Jimenez's possession of a gun was a crime "in and of itself," thereby suggesting
to the jury that it should consider matters that were not properly before it, and (d) the
prosecutor asked Monica if she assisted in "concealing" Jimenez from police, again
suggesting to the jury that it should consider matters that were not properly before it.
Although the judge sustained each objection by the defense with respect to the
improper matters, the rulings could not have had an effect on the jury. Specifically, with
respect to the first and second matters, while an objection was recorded when the
prosecutor made the improper statement, the judge did not rule on the matter until after
the jury had been excused. (See R. 343:369; 344:469; 344:403; 344:472.) Consequently,
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the jury was not aware that the objections had been sustained.
The timing of the ruling is relevant since the jury was instructed at the close of trial
that if the court sustained an objection, the jury may not consider the matter. (R. 238.)
Because the trial judge issued a ruling outside the presence of the jury, the jury was not
aware that it could not consider the possibility that Jimenez used several aliases and/or
had a violent past.
With respect to the third and fourth matters, although the judge sustained each
objection while the jury was present, the judge did not attempt to cure the impropriety.
The judge did not instruct the jury that it must disregard the prosecutor's statement that
Jimenez's possession of a firearm was a crime "in and of itself," and that Jimenez
concealed himself from authorities. Thus, the jury may have determined that even if
Jimenez was innocent of the charged offenses, he was a bad man and may as well be
punished now that he has been caught.
More specifically, the prosecutor engaged in improper conduct as follows.
(a) The prosecutor suggested that Jimenez used numerous aliases. After the state
completed examination of its witnesses, the defense presented its case. The defense
began by stating that it intended to call Dr. Robert Rothfeder to testify with respect to
injuries Jimenez suffered when he was severely beaten in 1994, two years before the
incident in this matter. (See R. 344:389-92.) According to the defense, Jimenez suffered
a skull fracture, head injuries and arm fracture when he was assaulted in Los Angeles in
13

1994. (R. 344:386, 389-390.)
Also, the defense expected that Dr. Rothfeder would provide testimony as to what
typically would occur physiologically when a person has been punched in the head. Dr.
Rothfeder's testimony related to the state's evidence, which reflected the following:
Immediately prior to the shooting, Rios punched Jimenez in the head knocking him to the
ground. (R. 344:393-99.)
The defense intended that Dr. Rothfeder's testimony would support the determination that Jimenez was incapable of forming a criminal mens rea due to head injuries.
Thus, Dr. Rothfeder's testimony was presented to support an acquittal in the matter.
In anticipation of Dr. Rothfeder's testimony, the defense called Jimenez to lay
foundation for medical records relating to the injuries Jimenez suffered in the 1994
assault. The defense elicited testimony from Jimenez that when he suffered the earlier
injuries, he provided an alias to the health care providers. He represented that his name
was Antonio Sanchez. (R. 343:366.) Jimenez testified that he used the alias because he
did not have money for hospital care. (R. 343:366.) Jimenez described the injuries he
suffered in 1994 and he identified the medical records relating to the matter. (R. 343:368.)
Thereafter, during cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Jimenez the following:
"So Mr. Jimenez, you admit you lied to the people who were providing you the medical
care?" (R. 343:369.) Jimenez answered, "Yes." The prosecutor then asked, "[Y]ou used
the name, what, Carlos Sanchez?" followed by, "These aren't the only other false names
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that you've used5 are they?" (R. 343:369.)
The prosecutor acknowledged that during the cross-examination he held up an FBI
rap sheet. (See 344:466-67.) He also admitted that he had no admissible evidence to
support his allegations concerning "other false names." (R. 343:369-70; 344:464, 466; see
also 344:467 (judge ruled FBI rap sheet was inadmissible).) The defense objected to the
examination as improper (R. 343:369). The judge did not rule on the matter until the
third day of trial when the parties reconvened outside the presence of the jury. At that
point, the judge sustained defendant's objection to the improper cross-examination. (R.
344:469.)
(b) The prosecutor suggested that Jimenez had a violent history. On the third day
of trial, Dr. Rothfeder testified. After the defense examined him with respect to head
injuries in general and Jimenez's injuries relating to the 1994 assault, the prosecutor
asked during cross-examination whether Jimenez provided the doctor with his "history of
violence[.]" (R. 344:403.) The defense objected to the question (R. 344:403) on the basis
that it suggested to the jury that Jimenez had a violent past. (See R. 344:463.) The trial
judge overruled the objection (R. 344:403) and allowed the prosecutor to proceed with the
examination. (Id.)
Thereafter, during proceedings outside the presence of the jury, the trial judge
reversed his prior ruling. (R. 344:472.) The judge determined that while it would have
been proper for the prosecutor to ask Dr. Rothfeder whether Jimenez had disclosed any
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other head injuries or trauma, the prosecutor's suggestion of violent behavior "would not
be relevant. And again I sustain[] the objection, finding that [] part of the answer would
not be relevant." (R. 344:472.)
(c) The prosecutor asserted during Monica's examination that Jimenez's
possession of a gun was a crime "in and of itself," thereby suggesting to the jury that
Jimenez had committed an uncharged crime. On the third day of trial, the defense called
Jimenez's wife, Monica (Neomi Monica Jimenez), to testify. Monica was a witness to
the October 20, 1996 incident. Among other things, she testified that on October 20, she
and Jimenez went to a dance club and bar for a few hours (R. 344:433), then stopped at
the 7-11 convenience store so that she could use the restroom. (R. 344:434.)
She testified that when they arrived at the 7-11, there was a verbal confrontation
between her husband and Montoya. Rios stepped outside the 7-11 store during the
confrontation and punched her husband in the face, knocking him to the ground. (R.
344:436-38.) She testified that when her husband stood up, he lifted his shirt and fired a
gun. (R. 344:438-39.) After the shooting, Jimenez ran in front of the white car, then
came running back. He told Monica to get into the car and they left. (R. 344:440.)
On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Monica the following questions:
[PROSECUTOR]: Did you know when you were at [the Me Mexico dance club]
[your husband] had a concealed gun on him?
[WITNESS]: No.
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[PROSECUTOR]: Did you know that the concealed weapon under that
circumstance would be a crime in and of itself?
(R. 344:444.) The defense objected to the question on the basis that it called the jury's
attention to an alleged criminal act that was not charged. The trial judge sustained the
objection. (R. 344:444, 471.) Nevertheless, the damage was done. Counsel for the
defense requested a curative instruction that the judge declined to provide. (Id. at 445.)
(d) The prosecutor asked Monica if she assisted in "concealing" Jimenez from
police, thereby suggesting to the jury that Jimenez unlawfully fled the jurisdiction; vet.
Jimenez was not charged with such conduct in this case. Later, during the same crossexamination, the prosecutor asked Monica whether she f,participate[d] in concealing"
Jimenez "from the police" for a period of time between the date of the occurrence and his
arrest in 1998. (R. 344:450.) Again, the defense objected to the question. Thereafter, the
trial judge called a recess and excused the jury in order to deal with the issues. (R.
344:450.) The question alluded to criminal conduct on the part of Jimenez that had not
been charged in this matter.
In addition, the question was meant to force Monica to incriminate herself, or to
exercise her rights under the Fifth Amendment.1

1

The Fifth Amendment provides that a person cannot be compelled to be a witness
against himself or herself in connection with any criminal case. The Utah Constitution
likewise provides that an accused person "shall not be compelled to give evidence against
himself." Utah Const, art. I, § 12.
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The prosecutor acknowledged the purpose of the question and stated that earlier
testimony from Monica elicited during cross-examination served as a basis for charging
her with concealing the car; thus, additional testimony suggesting participation in
criminal activity would be harmless:
Your Honor, noting that the witness [Monica] has already confessed to one crime
of hiding the car, and we're still within the statute of limitations, and that is
tampering with evidence, we're kind of almost moot at this point on that particular
issue. If she, in fact, wants to consult counsel, come back and say that she either
cares to take the Fifth Amendment or she cares to testify, that would be fine. And
the State, of course, would have to go along with that.
(R. 344:451.) The defense objected to the prosecutor's tactics, and the trial judge
sustained the objection. (R. 344:477.)
2. The Law Prohibits the Prosecutor from Interjecting Information or Making
Improper Suggestions Concerning Defendant's Character.
An underlying premise of the criminal justice system is that a defendant must be
tried for what he did, not who he is. Therefore, a prosecutor may not seek a conviction
with suggestions that the defendant is a bad person. The prejudicial impact to a jury of
the defendant's sordid background can be devastating.
In this case, prior to trial the defense moved under Rules 609, 402, and 403, Utah
Rules of Evidence, to exclude evidence of Jimenez's prior crimes or bad acts. (R. 15556.) The state stipulated to the request (see R. 193 (representing that state stipulated to
motion)), and the trial court granted the motion. (R. 343:172.)
Rule 609 permits a party to present evidence of prior criminal conduct only in
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limited circumstances. Specifically, the evidence may be presented to attack the
witness's credibility if the witness has been convicted of a crime involving dishonesty or
a crime that is punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year. Utah R. Evid.
609(a) (2000). Rules 402 and 403 prohibit the presentation of irrelevant evidence and
evidence that is more prejudicial than probative in value. Utah R. Evid. 402, 403 (2000).
Rule 404(b) likewise provides that M[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is
not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity
therewith." The rule specifies the circumstances under which evidence relating to such
acts may be admissible. Utah R. Evid. 404(b) (2000).
In this case, inasmuch as the state stipulated to the entry of an order to exclude
evidence of bad acts and criminal conduct (see R. 155-56; 193), the prosecutor's
references to aliases, a violent history, and uncharged criminal conduct violated the
pretrial order and evidentiary rules.
That is, notwithstanding the pretrial rulings and the Utah Rules of Evidence, the
prosecutor made statements during witness examinations that called the jury's attention to
matters the jury was not allowed to consider. See Utah R. Evid. 402, 403, 404(b),
609(a)(1) (2000). The prosecutor improperly referred to unidentified aliases allegedly
used by Jimenez, a violent past, and uncharged criminal conduct. See Troy, 688 P.2d at
486-87 (counsel is obligated to avoid any reference to matters the jury is not justified in
considering; also, prosecutor's question concerning defendant's criminal background and
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alias was improper); State v. Bain. 575 P.2d 919 (1978) (prosecutor's reference to the fact
that defendant fled to avoid arrest was improper).
The improper conduct was particularly contemptuous in this case where the
prosecutor was well aware of the pretrial ruling, and presumably aware of the evidentiary
rules. This is not a situation where the prosecutor asked an arguably innocuous question
that prompted the witness to blurt out the information. Rather, in a deliberate fashion, the
prosecutor interjected the improper, offensive information in an effort to influence and
inflame the jury. In blatant disregard of the rules and pretrial order, the prosecutor
conveyed improper information to the jury.
Pursuant to Rule 3.4(e), Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, a lawyer may not
allude to any matter "that the lawyer does not reasonably believe is relevant or that will
not be supported by admissible evidence[.]" See Troy, 688 P.2d at 486-87 (counsel is
obligated to avoid any reference to matters the jury is not justified in considering; also,
prosecutor's question concerning defendant's criminal background was an improper
attempt to bias the jury). The improper questions in this matter were an attempt by the
prosecutor to create an impression in the minds of jury members that Jimenez was a bad
person, and should not be believed because he had a violent history, went by an unknown
number of aliases, and violated the law by carrying a concealed weapon and fleeing the
jurisdiction.
In this case it was improper for the prosecutor to allude to the matters set forth
20

above. Span, 819 P.2d at 335. Jimenez has met the first prong in establishing that the
trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion for a mistrial/new trial for
prosecutorial misconduct. See Basta, 966 P.2d at 268.
B. UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE, THE ERROR WAS
SUBSTANTIAL AND PREJUDICIAL. REQUIRING REVERSAL.
A prosecutor's misconduct constitutes reversible error when the error is
"substantial and prejudicial such that there is a reasonable likelihood that in its absence,
there would have been a more favorable result for the defendant." Hay, 859 P.2d at 7
(cites omitted); Harmon, 956 P.2d at 276; Pearson, 943 P.2d at 1352; Troy, 688 P.2d at
486-87; see Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1224 (citing State v. Andreason. 718 P.2d 400, 403 (Utah
1986)).
When the prosecutor improperly suggests to the jury that defendant has gone by
several aliases, has a sordid or violent history, or has committed uncharged crimes, those
suggestions individually and cumulatively may have an enormous impact on a
defendant's case. The error is substantial.
In this case, although the prosecutor did not elicit a response to his improper
questions, the effect was devastating: the jury was left with the impression that the
defense objected to the questions in order to hide information about Jimenez.
The improper questions in this case presented the jury with an opportunity to
assume that Jimenez was a bad person and was probably guilty of the crimes at issue
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because he was violent or had committed other crimes, or that Jimenez had something to
hide about his past. "The deep tendency of human nature to punish not because [the
defendant] is guilty this time but because he is a bad man and may as well be condemned
now that he is caught is a tendency which cannot fail to operate with any jury, in or out of
court." 1 A.J. Wigmore, Evidence § 57 at 1185 (Tillers rev. 1983). "The insinuation that
other evidence exists encourages the jury to determine its verdict based upon evidence
outside the record and jeopardizes a defendant's right to a trial based upon the evidence
presented." State v. Young. 853 P.2d 327, 349 (Utah 1993).
In this case, the suggestion that Jimenez used aliases, had a violent history, or
engaged in uncharged criminal conduct may have added critical weight to the
prosecutor's case, while Jimenez was powerless to dispute it. Indeed, Jimenez could not
dispute the implication left by the improper questions without possibly opening a door to
the presentation of information that otherwise would be inadmissible. Thus, once the
improper suggestions were out, if witnesses did not answer, the suggestions left the jury
with the impression that the defense had something to hide. The improper conduct
constituted substantial error.
The error also was prejudicial. Utah appellate courts have ruled that prosecutorial
misconduct is prejudicial when it is directed at the defendant, when the misconduct
relates to an issue that the jury must decide, and when the jury is presented with a case
that involves credibility issues surrounding the witnesses. See Troy, 688 P.2d at 486;
22

State v. Bvrd, 937 P.2d 532, 536 (Utah App. 1997).
In Troy, 688 P.2d at 486, the prosecutor committed misconduct when he referred
to defendant's alias and residential situation under a federal identity program, when he
asked about defendant's "various criminal matters," and when he compared the defendant
to criminals who have "all kinds of irrational behavior ... Hinckley is a classic example."
Id. Since the misconduct was directed at the defendant, the supreme court determined the
error was "qualitatively different" from misconduct directed at other witnesses: the jury
was more likely to be influenced by the misconduct. Span, 819 P.2d at 335 (where
misconduct is directed at defendant, court is more inclined to find that jury was unduly
influenced by misconduct); see also State v. Wiswell 639 P.2d 146, 147 (Utah 1981);
Byrd, 937 P.2d at 536; State v. Morrison. 937 P.2d 1293, 1297 (Utah App. 1997).
The misconduct in this case was more egregious than that identified in Troy.
While various defense witnesses were testifying, the prosecutor referred to an unknown
number of aliases used by Jimenez and a violent past, and the prosecutor made allegations
against Jimenez concerning uncharged crimes. The prosecutor's conduct was directed at
the defendant. Also, the prosecutor raised the improper matters during the testimony of
defense witnesses to cause the jury to believe that each witness was concealing negative
information about Jimenez. The prosecutor presented the improper information in that
fashion to make the jury suspicious of the defendant and the motives of each witness. On
that basis, the prosecutor's misconduct was prejudicial.
23

In addition, prosecutorial misconduct is more likely to unduly influence the jury
when the jury is presented with conflicting evidence and is required to resolve credibility
issues. Troy, 688 P.2d at 486. "Courts have generally refused, however, to conclude that
evidence was overwhelming in cases that ultimately rested on the jury's resolution of
conflicting evidence, particularly where the defendant's credibility is involved." Byrd,
937 P.2d at 536; Andreason, 718 P.2d at 403 ("When the evidence in the record is
circumstantial or sufficiently conflicting, jurors are more likely influenced by an improper
argument").
If the conclusion of the jurors is based on their weighing conflicting evidence or
evidence susceptible of differing interpretations, there is a greater likelihood that
they will be improperly influenced through remarks of counsel. Indeed, in such
cases, the jurors may be searching for guidance in weighing and interpreting the
evidence. They may be susceptible to influence, and a small degree of influence
may be sufficient to affect the verdict.
Trov. 688 P.2d at 486; Andreason. 718 P.2d at 403.
To that end, this Court may consider the nature of the state's evidence and the
defendant's case. See State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769, 787 (Utah App. 1991) (prejudice
analysis compares impact of prosecutorial misconduct, other evidence of guilt and
evidence that may absolve defendant of crime).
Here, a pivotal issue concerned Jimenez's perceptions of danger. While Rios
testified that he, Miera, and Montoya did not threaten Jimenez with a weapon, Jimenez
and Dr. Rothfeder testified to Jimenez's perceptions. Dr. Rothfeder testified to the impact
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a head injury and trauma may have on Jimenez. In addition, Monica's testimony
supported the determination that Montoya and Miera threatened her husband. (R.
344:436-38.)
It is not a coincidence that the prosecutor engaged in the improper conduct during
cross-examination of Jimenez, Dr. Rothfeder, and Monica. The improper examination
likely made the jury distrustful of those witnesses; the jury may have believed the
witnesses were hiding information from them concerning Jimenez's alleged violent,
criminal, suspicious past. Thus, the jury may have considered the witnesses unworthy of
belief.

There is a reasonable likelihood that in the absence of the prosecutorial

misconduct, the jury would have acquitted Jimenez entirely of the crimes.
Another relevant issue in Jimenez's case was whether Miera, Montoya or Rios
threatened Jimenez with a weapon, thereby justifying Jimenez's use of deadly force.
Jimenez presented evidence to support the determination that officers failed to properly
investigate the scene to determine whether Rios, Montoya and Miera possessed a weapon
during the encounter; indeed, the officers' investigation of the crime scene was
inadequate. Because the officers failed to conduct an adequate investigation, the state
was unable to present compelling evidence to dispute Jimenez's claims concerning the
weapon.
The state and Jimenez offered conflicting versions of the events surrounding the
matter. The case came down to the word of the defense against the word of the state's
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witnesses. See Byrd, 937 P.2d at 536. The jury "could have found either way." Troy,
688 P.2d at 487. The prosecutor knew that he was facing an unpredictable jury. He
apparently found the prospect too daunting and determined to circumvent the rules to
bolster his case. The prosecutor's tactics should not be reinforced with a finding of
harmless error.
The verdict in this case reflects that the jury was not overwhelmed by the state's
evidence of guilt. A reasonable likelihood exists that the jury compromised the verdict
and rendered a conviction for the lesser offenses because of the improper statements and
suggestions. Without the statements, the jury may have acquitted.
While evidence presented by the defense would have absolved Jimenez of the
crimes, the prosecutor's improper tactics tipped the balance against him. Under these
circumstances, the evidence against Jimenez was not so overwhelming as to overcome the
prejudice that existed as a result of the prosecutor introducing the suggestion that Jimenez
was a bad or violent person. In this case, there was a likelihood that jurors were
improperly influenced by the prosecutor's improper suggestions and negative
implications concerning the defendant. By alluding to criminal conduct that was not
charged, a violent history, and a suspicious past, the prosecutor may have caused the jury
to convict Jimenez for who he was and not what he allegedly did. Jimenez was prejudiced by the prosecutor's misconduct. The trial court erred in failing to order a new
trial.
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C. ALTHOUGH THE TRIAL COURT SUSTAINED THE OBJECTIONS TO
THE PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT, THE JURY WAS ALLOWED TO
CONSIDER THE IMPROPER INFORMATION DURING DELIBERATIONS.
THAT IS, IN SOME INSTANCES, THE RULINGS WERE MADE OUTSIDE
THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY. ALSO, THE TRIAL JUDGE FAILED TO
TAKE CORRECTIVE MEASURES IN THE FACE OF THE IMPROPER
CONDUCT.
Although the trial court sustained the defense's objections to the four occasions of
prosecutorial misconduct during cross-examination, the judge in two instances did not
sustain the objections in front of the jury. In addition, the trial judge made no attempt to
cure the damage caused by the misconduct. Thus, the jurors were not instructed to
disregard the statements, and they were not informed that they may not draw any negative
inference about Jimenez from the statements and suggestions.2

2

At the close of trial, jurors were generally instructed that they should "not consider as
evidence any statement of counsel made during the trial." (R. 250.) That instruction may
be relevant where counsel has made an assertion of fact that is not supported by the
evidence. Such an instruction may not be sufficient to cure the misconduct here.
In this case, the prosecutor asked questions in such a way as to cause the jury to
make an improper presumption or to draw an improper inference.
Stated another way, while the prosecutor may attack a witness's credibility with
evidence of prior crimes, etc., such evidence, even if admissible, may not be used for
substantive purposes. Even if the state had presented evidence of prior bad acts, the jury
would only be allowed to consider the evidence for impeachment purposes.
In this case, a proper curative instruction would have advised the jury to disregard
the statements in their entirety and to refrain from drawing any adverse presumptions
from the statements. The jury was not instructed in that fashion in connection with the
improper statements. Indeed, because the jury was not advised that the objections were
sustained or the statements were improper, the jury was not aware that it was prohibited
from drawing any adverse inferences from the remarks.
27

Also, the prosecutor added insult to injury when he made reference to his improper
statements during closing argument. Specifically, during surrebuttal, the prosecutor
stated, "We talked about [Jimenez] going into something with a concealed firearm
because of his propensity to obey or not to obey the law." (R. 345:694.) The prosecutor
was referring to the improper statement he made during Monica's cross-examination:
"Did you knowr that the concealed weapon under that circumstance would be a crime in
and of itself?" (R. 344:444.) Reference to the improper statement was one of the last
statements the prosecutor made to the jury before deliberations, thereby ensuring the
prejudicial effect of his misconduct.
The prosecutorial misconduct was not properly cured in this case. In some
instances the jury was never informed that it could not consider the improper statements
and innuendoes. For the reasons set forth herein, Jimenez respectfully requests that this
Court reverse the matter and remand the case for further proceedings.
POINT II. THE PROSECUTOR ENGAGED IN MISCONDUCT DURING
CLOSING ARGUMENT WHEN HE COMPARED JIMENEZ'S
APPEARANCE AT TRIAL IN A SUIT, WITH RIOS'S APPEARANCE AT
TRIAL IN PRISON CLOTHES AND SHACKLES.
A. THE PROSECUTOR MADE IMPROPER REMARKS DURING CLOSING
ARGUMENT.
As set forth above (Point I, supra), the Utah Supreme Court has established a two
prong test for reversals for improper statements of counsel. The test considers whether
the remarks of counsel "call to the attention of the jurors matters which they would not
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be justified in considering in determining their verdict," and whether the jurors were
"probably influenced by those remarks." State v. Valdez, 513 P.2d 422, 426 (Utah
1973); accord State v. Emmett 839 P.2d 781, 785 (Utah 1992); Troy. 688 P.2d at 486;
State v. Palmer. 860 P.2d 339, 342 (Utah App. 1993).
In this case, during closing argument, the prosecutor called improper matters to the
attention of jurors. Specifically, the prosecutor unfairly commented on Jimenez's
character and sought to place his credibility in issue by comparing him to Rios. Rios was
a state witness, who attended trial in prison clothes and shackles. (R. 343:226.) Rios
admitted at trial that he was imprisoned on four counts of aggravated assault and
attempted aggravated burglary. (R. 343:226.) He also committed manslaughter. (R.
343:226.)
During closing argument the prosecutor argued that Rios was honest in who he
was, as reflected in the fact that he wore prison clothes and shackles. The prosecutor also
argued that if the jury were to compare Jimenez to Rios, the same could not be said of
Jimenez: Jimenez attended trial in a suit and tie, and he had a haircut and glasses.
According to the prosecutor, the jury should not trust what Jimenez said because his
appearance was a lie. Specifically, the prosecutor stated the following:
Also I ask you this, in terms of the defendant and his credibility as to the
events, you have had a chance to see not only the defendant in this courtroom
today and this week with how he presents himself, with how he packages himself
in appearance and dress and haircut and glasses and demeanor, in temper or lack
thereof, you have seen him in every one of those aspects on October 20th, 1996. Is
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this an honest packaging?
Manny Rios was here in chains. Manny Rios should be in chains. But
Manny Rios isn't anything except what Manny Rios is. But you have - and I
recall - I want you to recall Mr. Shapiro's opening statement, and he was talking
about the newly - the couple, not newly married couple, but the couple, they had
gotten their child a baby-sitter and they were able to go out for this date. Just your
average couple. And on the other hand we had the drunken rowdy trouble making
boxers cruising for trouble. Is either one of those portrayals honest now that you
know the situation? Or is it part of the packaging?
(R. 345:659-60.) The prosecutor's remarks necessarily commented unfairly on Jimenez's
character and they interfered with his right to the presumption of innocence. The remarks
were improper; they called attention to matters that should not have been considered by
jurors in reaching their verdict. The defense objected and moved for a mistrial. The trial
court acknowledged a timely objection, but ruled that a mistrial was not warranted. (R.
345:667,701,708-09.)
This Court has recognized that a defendant has the right to be "tried in front of a
jury in the 'garb of innocence[.]'n State v. Mitchell 824 P.2d 469, 473 (Utah App. 1991).
"Numerous cases support the view that this right is an essential component of a fair and
impartial trial." Id; see also State v. Bennett. 2000 UT 25,ffl[3-4,387 Utah Adv. Rep.
74; Chess v. Smith. 617 P.2d 341, 344 (Utah 1980). "The prejudicial effect that flows
from a defendant's appearing before a jury in identifiable prison garb is not measurable,
and it is so potentially prejudicial as to create a substantial risk of fundamental unfairness
in a criminal trial." Chess. 617 P.2d at 344. Thus, attending trial in the "garb of
innocence" comports with fundamental fairness and the basic presumption of innocence.
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A prosecutor's comment on such a matter, as though the defense were attempting
to present a deceptive image of the defendant, should be considered as offensive as a
prosecutor's comments on a defendant's right to remain silent while in police custody, see
Dovle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976) (a prosecutor may not refer to defendant's postMiranda silence to suggest guilt), or a prosecutor's comments that defendant failed to take
the witness stand to assert his innocence. Inasmuch as the defendant is cloaked with
certain fundamental rights to ensure a fair trial, it is improper for the prosecutor to
discredit a defendant and to criticize his character in front of the jury because he has
exercised those rights. Indeed, such remarks on the part of the prosecutor generally have
been construed to interfere with a defendant's right to a fair trial. See State v. Bvrd, 937
P.2d 532 (Utah App. 1997). The prosecutor's comments in this case were improper and
violated Jimenez's right to a fair trial.
B. A REASONABLE LIKELIHOOD EXISTS THAT IN THE ABSENCE OF
THE PROSECUTOR'S IMPROPER COMMENTS, THE JURY WOULD HAVE
RETURNED A VERDICT MORE FAVORABLE TO THE DEFENDANT.
Under the circumstances of this case, the jury was probably influenced by the
improper statements. Specifically, the comments were made during closing argument and
immediately prior to jury deliberations. They undoubtedly left an impression on the
jurors during deliberations.
Also, when the defense objected to the comment, the trial court did not provide a
curative instruction to alleviate possible prejudice. Rather, sometime later during
31

Lemcke's surrebuttal remarks, the judge reminded the jury that "nothing the attorneys say
is evidence." (R. 345:689; see also R. 250 (jury was generally instructed in that same
respect).)
That curative instruction was not adequate where the prosecutor sought to discredit
Jimenez's character based on the fact that Jimenez exercised a fundamental right. The
trial court should have instructed the jury to disregard the remarks and to refrain from
drawing any adverse inference or presumption from them. The court failed to instruct the
jury in that respect. Thus, the instructions here were insufficient to overcome the
prejudicial effect of the improper comment. See Kohl 2000 UT 35, ^[24 (where prosecutor alluded to facts not in evidence, instructions to jury overcame prejudicial effect).
The prosecutor compared Jimenez's appearance to Rios's specifically to impeach
Jimenez's exculpatory version of the events. It directly linked the credibility of Jimenez's
defense to the appearance he was entitled to present at trial. Moreover, as set forth above,
the evidence against Jimenez was not so overwhelming. Jimenez presented evidence to
support self-defense, including testimony to support the determination that officers failed
to investigate the scene to determine if Miera, Montoya and Rios were armed to justify
Jimenez's use of deadly force.
Here, the jurors were weighing Rios's version of the events against the evidence
presented by the defense. The evidence was susceptible of differing interpretations
and/or it created credibility issues. Thus, there was a greater likelihood that the jurors
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would be improperly influenced by the comments. The jurors may have been searching
for guidance in weighing and interpreting the evidence. They may have been especially
susceptible to influence, and a small degree of influence may have been sufficient to
affect the verdict. Under such circumstances, the prosecutor was obligated to avoid, as
far as possible, any reference to matters the jury would not be justified in considering.
Troy, 688 P.2d at 486-87.
The jury obviously was not overwhelmed by the state's case as reflected in the
verdict for the lesser offenses. A reasonable likelihood exists that the jury compromised
the verdict and rendered a conviction on the lesser offenses because of the improper
comments. Since the improper remarks undermined a fundamental right, the remarks
compel the entry of an order reversing the judgment.
POINT III. THE ERRORS IN THIS CASE COMPEL REVERSAL UNDER
THE CUMULATIVE-ERROR DOCTRINE.
In the event the individual errors in this case may be harmless, the cumulative
effect of the errors requires reversal. Whitehead v. American Motors Sales Corp., 801
P.2d 920, 928 (Utah 1990); see also Dunn. 850 P.2d at 1229. Here, Jimenez was
effectively denied a fair trial where the prosecutor interjected improper statements during
cross-examination of defense witnesses, and he engaged in misconduct by attacking a
fundamental right in closing argument to discredit the defendant's case. The prosecutor
was aware of weaknesses in his case, and dealt with them by circumventing pretrial
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rulings, the rules of evidence, and Jimenez's constitutional right to a fair trial. Such a
cynical strategy should not be allowed. The errors alone and together should undermine
this Court's confidence that "a fair trial was had." State v. Finlavson. 956 P.2d 283, 295
(Utah App. 1998) (quoting State v. Alonzo. 932 P.2d 606, 617 (Utah App. 1997)), affd.
2000 UT 10, 994 P.2d 1243.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, Jimenez respectfully requests that this Court
reverse the conviction in this case, and remand the matter for further proceedings as this
Court may deem appropriate.
SUBMITTED this iLday of

, 2000.

LINDA M. JONESj
DAVID FINLAYSON
Counsel for Defendant/Appellant
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(COMMITMENT)

THE STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff,

C:

vs

^V^fl

.

J\Z\M\

~

^

,iV^^WviM^

Defendant. •

D O S ^-|iWo

Case No..
Count No.
Honorable^
Clerk
Reporter.
Bailiff
Date

XL

.to enter a judgement of conviction for the next lower category of offense and
D The motion of
impose sentence accordingly is D granted a denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence
should not be imposed, and defendant haying been convicted byjD a jury; n the court, • Dleawofguilty;
• plea of no contest; of the offense of \V\^A/K
J^^LAJX^
of t h e ^ — degree^D adass
misdemeanor, being now proentii«\<¥HjJJ and ready for sentence and
represented bv )iffiffij[% i ^ / y ^ a n d the State being represented b y j ^ ^ ^ £ ] s now adjudged guilty
of the above offense, is noWsentenced
>v$se
to a term in the Utah State P
•
to a indeterminate term not to exceed one year. D at defendant's election.
years and which nrjay be life;
•
to a maximum mandatory term of
•
not to exceed five years;
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years;
of not less than five years and which may be for life;
• not to exceed
years;
and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $.
D
and ordered to pay restitution in the amoun

x

&i/

^JJ\L rt .x/yyw. HC/V\ J

JPVVvJ

D ^ such sentence is to run concurrently with
^.
J{
such sentence is to run consecutively with (}4%-il y T f o
upon motion of • State, • Defense, • Court, Court(s)

y

^ ^
zttz
£

I //^
are hereby dismissed.

Defendant is granted a stay of above (• prison) sentence and placed on probation in the custody of
this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult Parole for the
period of
, pursuant to the attached conditipns of probation.
Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County£s£for delivery to the
Utah State Prison, Draper, Utah, or • for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be
confined and imprisoned in accordance with this judgment and commitment.]
Commitment shall issue
,
/^j£ A J
DATED this.

.day of.

APPROVED AS TO FORM:
Defense Counsel
Deputy County Attorney
(White-Court)

(Green-Judge)

Page.
(Yeltow-Jail/Pnson/AP&P)

(Pink-Defense)

(GokJenrod-State)

00308

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR
OR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH

JUDGMENT, SENTENCE
(COMMrTMENT)

Plaintiff,
o

/S.

c
I
I

1

1

^ s\

s-*iDefendant.!
ueienaanu

_ ^

Count No. , , ^ , ^ — \ / - ^ , —
Honorable d y ^ U M ^ A i J^sfii^a
ri
Clerk
-*
ytA)ft r t Quj, .*
Reporter.
Bailiff
Date

Wd&i 3S

D The motion of
.to enter a judgement of conviction for the next lower category of offense and
impose sentence accordingly is D granted • denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence
should not be imposed, and defendant
int jiving
having been convicted by pajury;
p a ji D th§ court, • pJea of .9|J%l\f^• plea^f no contest; of the offense of U ¥ » t f u l l b v v AMJUdta*
/rTi^^^^^^SnT^
of the^X ripgrpp n a otass
misdemeanor,
isdemeanor, being now pre$
present in c firt and ready for sentence and
represented by ^ ^ ^ j j ^ j o J v a n d t h e State being represented byr ^ ^ ^ now adjudged guilty
of the above offensejsTnoft sentenced to a term in the Utah State !
• to a indeterminate term not to exceed one year. D at defendant's election
• to a maximum mandatory term of
years and which
not to exceed five years;
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years;
#
of
not less than five years and which may be for life;
•
years;
• not to exceed
• and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $_
ancLordered to pay restitution in the amount
y^
D
D

•
•

X

such sentence is to run concurrently with v A ytiMuL/y^^ii
such sentence is to run consecutively with.
upon motion of n State, • Defense, D Court, Court(s).

.are hereby dismissed.

Defendant is granted a stay of above (• prison) sentence and placed on probation in the custody of
this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult Parole for the
period of
, pursuant to the attached conditions of probation.
Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake Count^jor delivery to the
Utah State Prison, Draper, Utah, or • for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be
confined and imprisoned in accordance with this judgment and commitment.
Commitment
issue
Lrumiiiiuiieiu shall
sneui issue
_
\
DATED this ZL %ay of

/l/^V

19

P

APPROVED AS TO FORM:
Defense Counsel
Page.

Deputy County Attorney
(White-Court)

(Green-Judge)

(Yellow-Jail/Pnson/AP&P)

(Pink-Defense)

(GokJenrod-State)
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
C \

THE STATE OF UTAH

( u O l I/O

I ^W"

JUDGMENT, SENTENCE
(COMMITMENT)

Plaintiff,

J^k\£3^=2SJl

vs.

Case No,
Count No.
Honorable
Clerk
Reporter.
Bailiff
Date

"KX^A.

Defendant.

—

WW\

iss

n The motion of
to enter a judgement of conviction for the next lower category of offense and
impose sentence accordingly is • granted • denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence
should not be imposed, and defendant havipg been convicted b^Lj a jujy; D the court, n^plejjt Qf.gujJ
• plea of no contest; of the offense of
j i L a v i r ^ x ^ Y ^ felony
or, Being
pte* ii
of the^g* degree, Daclass
misdemeanor,
being now
nowprte^ent
ady for sentence and
represented by^^Sj^o^—
. and the State being represented by
[>is now adjudged guilty
of the above offense, is now sentenced to a term in the Utah State
• to a indeterminate term not to exceed one year. D at defendant's election
years and which may bepe
• to a maximum mandatory term of
not to exceed five years;
#
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years;
t^»
^
• of not less than five years and which may be for life;
^Sr^^X^"
• not to exceed
years;
^f
°U
and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $
. :y
§
-A
prdered to pay^stitiftion
in
the
amcfljrrtffi^jG?
AArsrJ^hJl^X.
y restitution
amount Qt
iJ\lV)r-^
^HA/vw^*JUL
such sentence is to run concurrently with_^
such sentence is to run consecutively with.
a upon motion of • State, • Defense, • Court, Court(s).
.are hereby dismissed.

u

•

y

Defendant is granted a stay of above (• prison) sentence and placed on probation in the custody of
this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult Parole for the
period of
, pursuant to the attached conditjpns of probation.
Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County jz(for delivery to the
Utah State Prison, Draper, Utah, or • for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be
confined and imprisoned in accordance with this judgment and commitment.
Commitment shalUssue
DATED this

APPROVED AS TO FORM:
Defense Counsel
Deputy County Attorney
(White-Court)

(Green-Judge)

Page_
(Yellow-Jail/Prison/AP&P)

(Pink-Defense)

-Of.

(Goktenrod-State)
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ADDENDUM B

UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Rule 24. Motion for new trial.
(a) The court may, upon motion of a party or upon its own initiative, grant
a new trial in the interest of justice if there is any error or impropriety which
had a substantial adverse effect upon the rights of a party.
Ob) A motion for a new trial shall be made in writing and upon notice. The
motion shall be accompanied by affidavits or evidence of the essential facts in
support of the motion. If additional time is required to procure affidavits or
evidence the court may postpone the hearing on the motion for such time as it
deems reasonable.
(c) A motion for a new trial shall be made within 10 days after imposition of
sentence,, or within such further time as the court may fix during the ten-day
period.
(d) If a new trial is granted, the party shall be in the same position as if no
trial had been held and the former verdict shall not be used or mentioned
either in evidence or in argument.

